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Chapter 40: The Taiwan Contingency: Russia as the Junior Partner

The year is 2027. The location is a SCIF—a Secure Compartmented Information Facility—deep in the bowels of the Pentagon. Known as "the Tank," it is a windowless hexagon, a sanctuary for the grim art of strategic wargaming. Tonight's scenario, a modified version of the now-famous CSIS 'First Battle of the Next War' wargame series, is projected in holographic blue on a massive central dais: "T-Day." The Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

General Marcus Thorne, the "Blue Team" commander, watches the simulation begin. The initial hours are a horrific, perfectly synchronized ballet of violence. Cyber-attacks cripple Taiwan's power grid. A storm of ballistic missiles craters airfields. A fleet of civilian roll-on/roll-off ferries, secretly retrofitted for war, begins its ponderous journey across the 100-mile strait. Thorne’s response unfolds with practiced precision. Stealth bombers lift from Guam. Carrier Strike Group Five, centered on the USS Ronald Reagan, turns its bow north. It is a desperate, bloody race against time, but the simulation's algorithms show a narrow path to victory.

Then, a quiet voice comes from the "Red Team" operator. "Inject," the operator says.

On the main holographic display, flashing amber alerts appear over Northern Europe. A calm computerized voice fills the room. "Alert. Russian Baltic Fleet initiates 'snap' naval exercises." A second alert: "SUDDEN, COINCIDENTAL OUTAGE OF TRANS-ATLANTIC UNDERSEA DATA CABLES REPORTED OFF COAST OF IRELAND." A third: "RUSSIAN CYBER ATTACKS TARGETING EUROPEAN STOCK MARKETS DETECTED." A fourth: "RUSSIAN ASAT TEST DECLARED, DEBRIS FIELD THREATENS KEY US SURVEILLANCE SATELLITES." It is not a full-scale attack on NATO. It is something more subtle: a perfectly timed, multi-domain symphony of coercion, delivered on behalf of Beijing.

In the Tank, the US response unravels. A frantic, simulated call comes in from the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. NATO's eastern flank is panicking. The President is on a simulated video call, his face grim, demanding assets be sent to Europe to "reassure panicked allies and calm the markets." The military logic of the Taiwan fight is being crushed by the political logic of the European crisis. Thorne is trapped. He curses, but the political and treaty obligations are absolute. With a quiet command, he orders the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group to divert from its planned course to the Pacific and instead steam at flank speed towards the North Atlantic. He is forced to re-task critical surveillance assets from the Taiwan Strait to the Baltics.

On the holographic display, the consequences are immediate. The narrow window for Blue Team's victory slams shut. Without the Ford, without the full ISR package, the US forces in the Pacific are now stretched too thin. The algorithms recalculate. The red tide of the Chinese invasion force, which had been on the verge of being checked, now washes over Taiwan’s beaches. The blue icon representing Taipei begins to blink, then fades to red. Game over.

Thorne stares at the board, the silence in the room heavy and absolute. He hadn't been defeated by a brilliant Chinese military strategy. He had been defeated by a phone call, by a calculated phantom crisis 5,000 miles away. The "no-limits friendship" was never just about economics or diplomacy. It was about this. Russia, the reckless senior partner in the rape of Ukraine, had flawlessly executed its role as the indispensable junior partner in the war for Taiwan, pinning down half the strength of the United States without firing a single shot, ensuring that China would not have to face America alone.

The Discourse 40: The Taiwan Contingency

40.1 A Division of Labor in Great Power Competition
While Russia and China operate as partners in their goal of dismantling the US-led order, the dynamic of the relationship is a situational "division of labor." In the Ukraine conflict, Russia is the senior partner/aggressor, and China is the junior partner/enabler. In a potential Taiwan conflict, the roles would reverse, with China as the senior partner/aggressor and Russia as the indispensable junior partner/enabler. Vladimir Putin's war in Ukraine has served as a valuable, real-world "lesson" and a critical test case for Xi Jinping as he weighs his own options for "reunification," with Putin himself noting Russia's "valuable experience" in withstanding Western pressure. See [citation 1].

40.2 Learning the Lessons of Ukraine
The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has meticulously studied every aspect of the war in Ukraine to prepare for a potential Taiwan invasion. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command has explicitly stated that the PLA is learning invaluable lessons about sanctions-proofing an economy, the challenges of amphibious assaults, the critical role of drone warfare, and, most importantly, the nature and speed of the Western political and military response. See [citation 2]. This has given China a multi-year, real-world case study, allowing it to wargame, adapt, and refine its own invasion plans based on Russia's failures and successes, a process documented in detail in the U.S. Defense Department's annual China Military Power Report. See [citation 3].

40.3 The "Two-Front" Nightmare: Russia's Enabling Roles
Russia's primary strategic value to China in a Taiwan contingency would be its ability to present the United States with a two-front war scenario. This is not limited to a simple military feint. Russia's role would be multi-domain:

• Military Fixer: A well-timed, coercive mobilization of Russian troops on the borders of the Baltic states or a naval crisis would be enough to force the US to divert critical high-end military assets—such as carrier groups, stealth bombers, and intelligence platforms—away from the Indo-Pacific theater.

• Energy and Food Security: Russia could surge its exports of oil, gas, and wheat to China to help it weather the storm of international sanctions that would inevitably follow an invasion, acting as a secure resource backyard.

• The Northern Sea Route: As Arctic ice melts, Russia's control of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) offers a vital, US-navy-proof shipping lane for Chinese commerce and for the importation of energy, bypassing traditional chokepoints.

• Space and Cyber Warfare: Russia and China could conduct coordinated cyber-attacks on Western financial targets or joint anti-satellite operations to disrupt the US military's command and control.

40.4 The Ultimate Payback
In this scenario, Russia's disruptive role would be the ultimate "payback" for the economic and diplomatic shield China has provided for its war in Ukraine. China's patient, strategic support for Russia's aggression in Europe is not without significant self-interest. By enabling Russia's war, China accomplishes two goals: it allows its junior partner to stress-test Western military and political resolve, generating invaluable lessons for its own plans, and it helps create a permanent security crisis on NATO's eastern flank, ensuring the United States will be perpetually distracted and its military resources divided. This is the ultimate payback: ensuring that when the decisive moment in the Pacific arrives, America will be neither fully focused nor fully prepared. See [citation 4].