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Chapter 30: The Taiwan Contingency: Russia as the Junior Partner

The year is 2027. We are in a secure, windowless briefing room deep within the Pentagon, a "tank" for strategic wargaming. The scenario is a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. As the simulation begins, the US response plan unfolds across the massive screens—carrier groups moving, bomber wings deploying, satellite coverage intensifying. The US "blue team" begins to establish a foothold.

Then, the "red team" operator plays a new card. A flashing alert appears on the global map: "UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF RUSSIAN FORCES MASSING ON ESTONIAN BORDER." A second alert flashes: "RUSSIAN BALTIC FLEET BEGINS 'SNAP' NAVAL EXERCISES." It is not a full-scale Russian attack on NATO. It is something more subtle, more insidious. It is a perfectly timed feint, a deliberate crisis-in-a-box.

In the simulation, the blue team commander is forced into an impossible choice. He must divert a carrier strike group from the Pacific to the North Atlantic to reassure panicked allies. He must re-task critical satellite and airborne surveillance assets from the Taiwan Strait to the Baltics. The carefully planned US response to the Taiwan invasion begins to unravel, stretched thin across two continents. The narrative illustrates the horrifying synergy of the "no-limits" pact: Russia, the aggressor in Ukraine, would become the indispensable accomplice in a war over Taiwan, pinning down US forces to ensure China does not have to face America alone.

The Discourse 30: Russia's Role in a Taiwan Crisis

30.1 A Shared Strategic Objective
While Russia and China operate as partners in their shared goal of dismantling the US-led order, the dynamic of the relationship is not static; it is situational. If Russia is the "senior partner" or aggressor in the European theater, it would become the crucial "junior partner" or enabler in any potential Chinese military action against Taiwan. Putin's war in Ukraine has not just been a Russian campaign; it has served as a valuable, real-world "lesson" and a critical test case for Xi Jinping as he weighs his own options for "reunification." [CITATION 1]

30.2 Learning the Lessons of Ukraine
The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been meticulously studying every aspect of the war in Ukraine to prepare for a potential Taiwan invasion. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command has explicitly stated that the PLA is learning invaluable lessons about sanctions-proofing the economy, the challenges of amphibious assaults, the critical role of drone warfare and decentralized command, and, most importantly, the nature and speed of the Western political and military response. [CITATION 2] This has given China a multi-year, real-world case study, allowing it to wargame, adapt, and refine its own invasion plans based on Russia's failures and successes.

30.3 The "Two-Front" Nightmare
Russia's primary strategic value to China in a Taiwan contingency would be its ability to create a simultaneous, major crisis in Europe, thereby presenting the United States with a two-front war scenario. [CITATION 3] This does not necessarily mean a direct Russian attack on NATO. A well-timed, coercive mobilization of Russian troops on the borders of the Baltic states, a naval blockade of Kaliningrad, or a sudden crisis in the Balkans would be enough to force the US and its European allies to divert critical high-end military assets—such as carrier groups, stealth bombers, aerial tankers, and intelligence platforms—away from the Indo-Pacific theater. This strategic "fixing" of US forces would make a successful defense of Taiwan exponentially more difficult.

30.4 The Ultimate Payback
In this scenario, Russia's role would be the ultimate "payback" for the economic and diplomatic shield China has provided for its war in Ukraine. China's patient, strategic support for Russia's aggression in Europe is not without self-interest. [CITATION 4] By allowing Russia to become a permanent, revanchist threat on NATO's eastern flank, China ensures that the United States will be perpetually distracted and militarily divided. This creates a far more favorable strategic environment for China to pursue its own primary objective: the seizure of Taiwan and the establishment of its military and economic hegemony in the Western Pacific.

References

1. Osborn, Andrew. "Putin tells Xi that Russia has 'valuable experience' of withstanding Western pressure." Reuters, March 21, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-tells-xi-that-russia-has-valuable-experience-withstanding-western-pressure-2023-03-21/

2. Aquilino, John C., Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on "U.S. Military Posture in the Indo-Pacific." March 8, 2024.

3. U.S. Department of Defense. "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2024." Annual Report to Congress, October 2024. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Oct/19/2003552932/-1/-1/1/2024-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF

4. Lü, Xiang. "The strategic alignment between China and Russia will continue." Interview with Foreign Affairs, January 17, 2024. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/lu-xiang-strategic-alignment-between-china-and-russia-will-continue